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I. INTRODUCTION
“There can be no keener revelation of a society’s soul than the
way in which it treats its children.” 1
* J.D., May 2015, The John Marshall Law School; B.A. Lewis University,
2011. I would like to thank and dedicate this article to the most important and
influential people in my life, my friends and family. Thank you Paula, Randy,
Matthew, and Megan Fugett for your endless love, support, and
encouragement. A special thank you to all of my close friends in law school
who supported me throughout the entire process including, but not limited to,
Michael Czopkiewicz, M. Catelyn Anderson, Ryan Hennen, Morgan
Mackovjak, Zain Ali, Haley Flans, Elizabeth Casey, Meghan Troc, Alexis Pool,
Heather Hensley, and Mary Ellen Richardson. Sincerest gratitude to Michael
Czopkiewicz and Professor Mary Nagel for introducing me to this topic.
Finally, thank you to my two highly esteemed editors, Alex Whitt and Joseph
Swee for all of your hard work and dedication to my article.
1. United States. v. Cunningham, 680 F. Supp. 2d 844, 847 (N.D. Ohio
2010).
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, every state responded to
what appeared to be a dramatic increase in violent juvenile
offenses by enacting laws that transfer juveniles into the adult
criminal justice system (“juvenile transfer laws”). 2 Juvenile
transfer laws allow for, and in some instances require, juveniles to
be prosecuted in the criminal justice system, even if they satisfy
the juvenile justice system’s jurisdictional age requirement. 3
States use three mechanisms to transfer juveniles into the adult
criminal justice system: judicial waivers, prosecutorial waivers,
and statutory exclusions. 4 Because of these mechanisms, the
number of adolescents under the age of eighteen that were
incarcerated in adult prisons increased 208% between 1990 and
2004. 5 Unfortunately, there are few accurate statistics detailing
the total number of juveniles transferred into the adult criminal
justice system each year. 6 But general studies estimate that as
many as 250,000 adolescents are prosecuted, sentenced, or
incarcerated as adults each year. 7 In fact, about ten percent of
2. NEELUM ARYA, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE , STATE TRENDS:
LEGISLATIVE VICTORIES FROM 2005 TO 2010 REMOVING YOUTH FROM THE
ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2011), available at http://www.campaign
foryouthjustice.org/documents/CFYJ_State_Trends_Report.pdf;
see
also
ROBERT HAHN ET AL., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, EFFECTS ON VIOLENCE OF LAWS &
POLICIES FACILITATING THE TRANSFER OF YOUTH FROM THE JUVENILE TO THE
ADULT JUSTICE SYSTEM 2 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/
pdf/rr/rr5609.pdf (asserting that from 1992–1999, forty-nine states enacted
new juvenile transfer mechanisms that make it easier for juveniles to be
transferred to the adult criminal justice system).
3. ARYA, supra note 2, at 5.
4. See id. (describing each of these transfer methods); see also PATRICK
G RIFFIN ET AL., O FFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, O FFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , TRYING
JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND
REPORTING 2 (2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/
232434.pdf (explaining that additional transfer laws include mandatory
waivers, reverse waivers, and criminal blending sentencing); O FFICE OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, O FFICE OF JUSTICE
PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , JUVENILE TRANSFER TO CRIMINAL COURT,
available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/reform/ch2_j.html (last visited Sept. 19,
2014) (explaining that other “mechanisms” to compel juvenile transfers to the
adult criminal justice system exist, such as presumptive waivers and “once an
adult always an adult” or automatic transfer legislation).
5. CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY,
YOUTH UNDER AGE 18 IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2006),
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/endsilence/documents/youthunder
18intheCJsystem.pdf.
6. G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
7. CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE , K EY FACTS: YOUTH IN THE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 3 (2012), available at http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/docu
ments/KeyYouthCrimeFacts.pdf; HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND,
O FFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, O FFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , JUVENILE O FFENDERS AND
VICTIMS : 2006 NATIONAL REPORT (2006), available at http://www.ojjdp.gov/
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adolescent offenders are incarcerated in adult prisons or jails. 8
Since the early 1990s, Illinois has enacted more transfer
provisions and laws than any state except for California. 9 In 1992,
Illinois implemented juvenile transfer laws. 10 This host of laws
included discretionary judicial waivers, 11 mandatory judicial
waivers, 12 presumptive judicial waivers, 13 automatic transfers, 14
and blended sentencing. 15 Illinois never enacted prosecutorial
discretion waivers and, in 2009, repealed reverse waivers. 16 Even
though California and Illinois have enacted the most juvenile
transfer laws, Florida transfers the largest number of juveniles
per capita into the adult criminal justice system each year. 17
Between 2003 and 2008, California transferred only about twenty
juvenile cases into the adult criminal justice system each year. 18
Although it is unclear how many juvenile cases Illinois transfers in
an average year, the state transferred over 120 juveniles into the
adult criminal justice system in 2008 alone. 19
Concurrent with the states’ expansive juvenile transfer
legislation, the Supreme Court expanded its Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. Specifically, the Court held that the Eighth

ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf; JASON ZIEDEN- BERG, NAT’L INST. OF
CORR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , YOU’RE AN ADULT NOW: YOUTH IN ADULT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEMS 2 (2011), available at http://static.nicic.gov/
Library/025555.pdf.
8. G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
9. See id. (explaining that Florida transfers eight times the number of
juveniles that California does).
10. Illinois Jurisdictional Boundaries, JUVENILE JUSTICE G EOGRAPHY,
POLICE , PRACTICE & STATISTICS, http://jjgps.org/jurisdictional-boundaries/
illinois#age-boundaries (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) [hereinafter Illinois
Jurisdictional Boundaries].
11. LINDSAY BOSTWICK, ILL. JUVENILE JUSTICE COMM ’N, ILL. CRIMINAL
JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTH., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE ILLINOIS
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 12 (2010), available at http://www.icjia.state.
il.us/public/pdf/ResearchReports/IL_Juvenile_Justice_System_Walkthrough_0
810.pdf; see also G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 3 (depicting Illinois’s juvenile
transfer laws as including discretionary, presumptive, and mandatory
waivers; statutory exclusions; “once an adult always an adult laws;” and
blended sentencing).
12. BOSTWICK, supra note 11, at 12.
13. Id. at 13.
14. Id. at 7.
15. Id. at 13.
16. Illinois Jurisdictional Boundaries, supra note 10.
17. See G RIFFIN, supra note 4, at 3 (explaining that Florida transfers eight
times the number of juveniles that California does).
18. Id. at 18.
19. Id.; see ERICA HUGHES & LINDSAY BOSTWICK, ILL. JUVENILE JUSTICE
COMM ’N, ILL. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AUTH., JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND RISK FACTOR DATA (2008), available at http://www.icjia.state.il.us
/public/pdf/ResearchReports/JJSRF_Data_2008_Annual_Rpt_March_2011.pdf
(stating that, in 2008, 120 juveniles in Illinois, not including juveniles in Cook
County, were transferred into the adult criminal justice system).
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Amendment categorically bars juveniles from being executed or
sentenced to life in prison without parole for non-violent crimes. 20
As part of the Court’s analysis, these landmark cases stressed the
fundamental and psychological differences between adolescents
and adults. The Court reasoned that juveniles are less culpable for
wrongdoing and have a greater capacity for change. 21 Based on
these distinctions, the Court found that juveniles should be
punished and sentenced differently than adults.
Overly expansive juvenile transfer laws are inconsistent with
the Court’s reasoning because their primary objective is to transfer
juveniles into the adult criminal justice system solely for the
purpose of punishing and sentencing them like adults. In so doing,
expansive juvenile transfer laws, more often than not, largely
ignore a juvenile’s diminished culpability and greater capacity for
change.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the juvenile
justice system, focusing primarily on its history and purpose. It
explores juvenile transfer legislation and discusses the various
types of juvenile transfer mechanisms. This section also examines
the Eighth Amendment in conjunction with the Supreme Court’s
response to over expansive juvenile transfer legislation. Part III of
this Comment analyzes the ways in which presumptive waivers
are inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. It also
examines the Illinois statute, 705 ILL. COMP. STAT 405/5-805. Part
IV of this Comment proposes that the Illinois legislature should
amend that statute to eliminate the presumptive waiver.

II. BACKGROUND I NFORMATION
A. An Overview of the Juvenile Justice System and
Juvenile Transfers Laws
The juvenile justice system was created in 1899 22 as a distinct
justice system for juveniles. 23 The system’s primary purpose was
20. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005); Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 75 (2010); Joanna L. Visser & Jeffrey J. Shook, The Supreme
Court’s Emerging Jurisprudence on the Punishment of Juveniles: Legal and
Policy Implications, 49 CT. REV . 24, 24 (2012), available at http://aja.ncsc.
dni.us/publications/courtrv/cr49-1/CR49-1Visser.pdf.
21. Visser & Shook, supra note 20, at 27–28.
22. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE , O FFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE , JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS
AND JAILS : A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT ix (2000), available at https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182503.pdf.
23. Before the inception of the juvenile justice system, and throughout
practically all of the 19th century, the American criminal justice system
prosecuted and sentenced children as adults. RICHARD LAWRENCE & CRAIG
HEMMENS, JUVENILE JUSTICE 20–21 (2008), available at http://www.sagepub.
com/upm-data/19434_Section_I.pdf.
Children
did
not
receive
any
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to focus on the rehabilitation of adolescents by balancing their
treatment with the “welfare” 24 and “the best interest of the
child.” 25 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the public and
state legislatures turned their back on this purpose.
During this time period, violent juvenile crime appeared to be
drastically increasing. 26 Although this was a nation-wide
misconception, the public decided that the juvenile justice system
was not harsh enough on juvenile offenders. 27 Legislative
policymakers and legal professionals, who have always struggled
to determine whether a juvenile should be transferred to the adult
criminal justice system, reacted swiftly and severely. 28 Ignoring
the need for a more measured approach, state legislators decided
to “get tough” on juvenile crime by revising existing or enacting
new transfer legislation. 29 As state legislators reacted to the
public’s reaction to the “crime wave,” they made it easier to
transfer juveniles into the adult criminal justice system. 30 These
accommodations; they did not have separate provisions, statutes, or
incarceration facilities. Id. In 1899, the very first juvenile court was founded in
Chicago, Illinois. Id. at 20.
24. AUSTIN ET AL., supra note 22, at ix.
25. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 23, at 20, 24 (asserting that the
juvenile justice system’s goal was to alter juvenile offenders into constructive
citizens by stressing “treatment” instead of punitive measures); see also
TIMOTHY J. BRANDAU, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE , TRANSFER OF
JUVENILE O FFENDERS TO ADULT COURT IN DELAWARE 1, available at
www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/documents/DE_YouthTransfer.pdf
(last
visited Sept. 19, 2014) (describing how “[t]he original goals of the juvenile
court were to investigate, diagnose, and prescribe treatment for offenders, not
to adjudicate guilt or fix blame”).
26. SHAY BILCHIK, O FFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, O FFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ,
JUVENILE JUSTICE : A CENTURY OF CHANGE 4 (1999) available at https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/178995.pdf.
27. Id.
28. EDWARD P. MULVEY & CAROL A. SCHUBERT, O FFICE OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, O FFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE , TRANSFER OF JUVENILES TO ADULT COURT: EFFECTS OF A
BROAD POLICY IN O NE COURT 2–3 (2012), available at http://www.ojjdp.
gov/pubs/232932.pdf (affirming that “policymakers and professionals” have
strong beliefs about whether juvenile offenders should be prosecuted and
sentenced in a different manner than adult offenders).
29. Jeffrey A. Butts & Daniel P. Mears, Reviving Juvenile Justice in a GetTough Era, 33 YOUTH & SOC’Y, 169, 169 (2001), available at http://www.
sagepub.com/martin/Butts.pdf.
30. From 1980 to 1994, the number of apprehensions for serious, violent
offenses committed by juveniles increased by 64%. MULVEY & SCHUBERT,
supra note 28, at 2. This increase drew relentless media coverage and drove
“intense legislative activity” that resulted in modern state transfer laws.
G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 9. The legislative process included correcting
and rewriting statues to expand broaden eligibility for juvenile transfers into
the adult criminal justice system. Id. In a short four-year span at the end of
the 1980s (1986 to 1990), ten states enacted automatic transfer laws—a 50%
increase—and eight implemented prosecutorial waiver systems—more than a
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new juvenile transfer laws encompassed an array of changes, such
as lifting age restrictions, increasing the number and classes of
crimes that make juveniles eligible for transfer, adding statutory
exclusions, and granting prosecutorial waivers. 31

B. Modern Juvenile Transfer Laws
Most states have a variety of juvenile transfer laws or
mechanisms in place. 32 Although there are different types and
combinations of juvenile transfer laws, they all fall into three basic
categories: judicial waivers, prosecutorial waivers, and statutory
exclusion laws. 33 The most traditional or common forms of juvenile
transfer laws are judicial waivers. 34 Judicial waivers give the
juvenile court judge discretion to waive juvenile court jurisdiction
and transfer juveniles into the adult criminal justice system. 35
Prosecutorial waivers, on the other hand, place the discretion in
the hands of prosecutors by allowing them to file cases in either
the juvenile or adult criminal court. 36 Unlike judicial and
prosecutorial waivers, statutory exclusions grant very little
discretion. 37 Instead, they simply look at “who fell into the
statutorily defined net of eligibility.” 38 Statutory exclusions largely

100% increase. Id. In recent years, though, the juvenile justice system has
been the target of “increasing scrutiny.” LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note
23, at 20.
31. MULVEY & SCHUBERT, supra note 28, at 2.
32. G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id. at 3. Throughout most of its history, the juvenile court system
primarily gave discretion to the juvenile court judge when deciding to transfer
a juvenile. MULVEY & SCHUBERT, supra note 28, at 2. Under modern transfer
law, discretionary judicial waivers require the application of expansive
standards and the balancing of specific factors. G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4,
at 2. Often, courts will consider “the nature of the alleged crime and the
individual youth’s age, maturity, history, and rehabilitative prospects.” Id.
Most important, the prosecutors bear the burden of proving that the waiver is
appropriate. Id. Presumptive waiver laws are different; they classify certain
offenses as once for which transfer from the juvenile court to criminal court is
“presumed appropriate.” Id. at 4. In such cases, the juvenile bears the burden
of presenting evidence establishing that he or she would be an appropriate fit
in the juvenile justice system. Id.
35. CHILDREN’S ACTION ALLIANCE , PROSECUTING JUVENILES IN THE ADULT
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 6 (2003), available at http://www.njjn.org/uploads/
digital-library/resource_119.pdf.
36. Id. An exercise of prosecutorial discretion “appears” to require a lower
threshold than statutory exclusion. Id.
37. See HAHN, supra note 2. Statutory exclusions limit juvenile justice
system jurisdiction with respect to certain crimes. Id. When a statutory
exclusion applies, the prosecutor has discretion to decide what charges to file.
Id. This decision “might determine whether the juvenile is transferred.” Id.
38. MULVEY & SCHUBERT, supra note 28, at 3.
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bar specific juvenile offenders from accessing the juvenile court
because of the type of crime that the juvenile committed. 39
Every state has at least one of these three general types of
transfer laws. 40 However, most employ additional transfer
mechanisms that do not fall within the three general categories of
juvenile transfer laws, including “once adult, always adult” (or
automatic transfer laws), 41 reverse waiver laws, 42 and blended
sentencing laws. 43

C. Illinois Juvenile Transfer Laws
Illinois juvenile transfer statutes allow for automatic
transfers 44 and blended criminal sentencing in the extended
juvenile jurisdiction statute. 45 Automatic transfers automatically
transfer a juvenile into the adult criminal justice system when
statutory requirements are satisfied. 46 Extended juvenile
jurisdiction statutes blend a juvenile’s sentence such that he or she
receives both juvenile and adult sentences. 47 Like every other

39. Id.
40. G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
41. Automatic transfer laws provide that juveniles who have been
previously prosecuted and convicted as adults must be automatically
transferred to adult court for any subsequent offenses. Id. at 7.
42. Reverse waivers allow juveniles who have pending cases filed in
criminal court to petition for removal to juvenile court. Id. Typically, reverse
waivers are only available to juveniles who are still under the age of majority
and whose case is “deemed inappropriate for the criminal court system.”
HAHN, supra note 2, at 3.
43. Blended sentencing “allows a juvenile to be sentenced to both juvenile
and adult sanctions by one court.” Id. Most commonly, a blended sentencing
regime provides that the juvenile “is tried in juvenile court and given a
juvenile disposition—but in combination with a suspended criminal sentence.”
G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 7. The effects of such sentencing regimes “are
not well understood.” Id.
44. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-130 (2013). After initial passage in 1983,
automatic transfer only applied to “murder, rape, sexual assault, or armed
robbery[.]” K OLLMANN, supra note 49, at 12–13. Over the ensuing years, the
legislature added additional offenses. Id. at 13. Illinois automatic transfer law
became “the most racially biased drug transfer law in the Nation[.]” ARYA,
supra note 2, at 35. Finally, in 2005, the legislature reduced the list of
automatic transfer offenses for the first time, id., by eliminating certain drug
crimes. K OLLMANN, supra note 49, at 13. By 2007, “automatic transfers in
Cook County” dropped “by more than two-thirds.” ARYA, supra note 2, at 35.
The list of automatic transfer offenses still includes criminal sexual assault,
aggravated battery with a gun, armed robbery with a gun, and carjacking with
a gun. K OLLMANN, supra note 49, at 73.
45. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-710(1)(b) (2013).
46. RICHARD E. REDDING, O FFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, O FFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ,
JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 2
(2010) available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/220595.pdf.
47. BOSTWICK, supra note 11, at 13.
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state, Illinois enacted these statutory provisions in order to “get
tough” on juvenile crime. 48
Illinois’s juvenile transfer laws are unlike most other states,
though, because they are broader and more expansive. 49 Under
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805, juveniles can be transferred to the
adult criminal justice system by a discretionary judicial waiver
(“discretionary
waivers”),
presumptive
judicial
waiver
(“presumptive waiver”), or mandatory judicial waiver (“mandatory
waiver”). 50
Discretionary waiver proceedings begin in the juvenile justice
system. 51 The juvenile court judge examines the individual case
and the statutory factors. Then, the judge may exercise his or her
discretion to determine whether the juvenile should be transferred
to the adult criminal justice system. 52 Mandatory waivers also
begin in the juvenile justice system. 53 However, mandatory
waivers only permit the juvenile court judge to confirm that the
48. Charles W. Thomas & Shay Bilchik, Prosecuting Juveniles in Criminal
Courts: A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 76 J. CRIM . L. & CRIMINOLOGY 439,
455 (1985).
49. See STEPHANIE K OLLMANN, ILL. JUVENILE JUSTICE COMM ’N, RAISING
THE AGE OF JUVENILE COURT JURISDICTION 10 (2012), available at http://ijjc.
illinois.gov/sites/www.ijjc-illinois.gov/files/assets/IJJC%20-%20Raising%20the
%20Age%20Report.pdf (clarifying that Illinois juvenile transfer laws are
applied “only after the default application of the juvenile court rules”).
50. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(1)-(3) (2013); G RIFFIN ET AL., supra
note 4, at 3.
A discretionary transfer can only occur where the adolescent is thirteen
years old or older and has committed a crime under Illinois law. 405/5805(3)(a). Further, the juvenile judge must hold an appropriate hearing. Id.
The hearing allows the consideration of a number of factors, including: “the
severity of the offense, degree of participation or premeditation, whether a
weapon was involved, probation history, school engagement, mental and
physical health history, history of abuse or neglect, services available in the
juvenile system, and likelihood of rehabilitation.” K OLLMANN, supra note 49,
at 40–41. After this hearing, the judge must find that “there is probable cause
to believe that the allegations in the motion are true and that it is not in the
best interest of the public” to proceed in juvenile court. 405/5-805(3)(a).
A presumptive transfer can only occur where the adolescent is fifteen years
old or older and has committed certain crimes. 405/5-805(2)(a). Presumptive
transfer allows for judicial discretion, but “place the burden on the youth to
establish that he/she should not be transferred.” K OLLMANN, supra note 49, at
13.
A mandatory transfer can only occur where the adolescent is fifteen years
old or older and has committed certain crimes. 405/5-805(1)(a). One of two
crimes suffices. First, the crime may be a forcible felony in furtherance of
“criminal activity by an organized gang.” Id. Second, the crime may be any
forcible felony if the juvenile previously committed a felony. Id. Thus,
“[m]andatory transfer hearings require specific probable cause findings
regarding offense characteristics, offense history, and/or gang activity.”
K OLLMANN, supra note 49, at 40.
51. G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 2.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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statutory requirements are satisfied. If said requirements are met,
the judge has no discretion; he or she must transfer the juvenile to
the adult criminal justice system. 54 Thus, mandatory waivers
operate in the same fashion as statutory exclusions. 55 As with both
other waivers, presumptive waivers—the third type of judicial
waiver—start in the juvenile justice system. Like discretionary
waivers, presumptive waivers give the judge discretion in
transferring a juvenile. However, unlike any other waiver,
presumptive waivers require that juveniles rebut the presumption
that they should be transferred. 56
This means juveniles have to prove that they should not be
transferred because they are amenable to treatment in the
juvenile justice system. 57 Essentially, presumptive waivers place
the burden of proof on the juvenile. 58 On the other hand, neither
discretionary nor mandatory waivers place the burden of proof on
the juvenile. 59 Presumptive waivers are wholly unique in this
regard. 60 Admittedly, both mandatory and presumptive waivers
require the state to prove that probable cause exists that the
relevant statutory requirements are satisfied. Once the state
satisfies this step, however, presumptive waivers create a
presumption that the juvenile is not amenable to treatment in the
juvenile justice system. 61 A similar rebuttable presumption is not
triggered when the state seeks a mandatory waiver.
Transferring juveniles to the adult criminal justice system
produces many negative effects on the adolescent’s physical
wellbeing, psyche, and identity formation. 62 Locking adolescents
up with adults guarantees that adolescents will not be
rehabilitated because they will not receive guidance from
responsible, supportive adults or have access to programs and
services that will help shape them into productive adults. 63
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. K OLLMANN, supra note 49, at 13.
57. Transfer Provisions, O FFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, O FFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE ,
http://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/tryingjuvasadult/transfer.html (last visited Nov. 3,
2014).
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Identity formation, a crucial aspect of a juvenile’s psyche, is greatly
harmed by incarceration in adult correctional facilities because “prisons and
jails are primarily designed to break down identities, not foster new, resilient
ones that are adaptive to the world outside the facility walls.” MULVEY &
SCHUBERT, supra note 28, at 5. Also, adult facilities are largely devoid of
positive, healthy adults or well-behaved, balanced peers with whom juveniles
can interact. Id. Further, the facilities’ heavy-handed control does not permit
juveniles to learn how to make self-governing decisions. Id.
63. ARYA, supra note 2, at 9. “[A]dolescents are operating with a ‘learner’s
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Some components of Illinois law demonstrate that the state is
at least somewhat aware of the detrimental effects that the adult
justice system has on juveniles. Four years ago, Illinois raised the
age of juvenile court jurisdiction. 64 Before this change was
implemented, seventeen-year-olds were automatically tried as
adults for all misdemeanor offenses. 65 Now, though, seventeenyear-olds who commit misdemeanor offenses fall within the
jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system. 66 Of course, seventeenyear-olds who are charged with felonies still fall under the purview
of the adult criminal justice system. 67 But even then, adolescents
under the age of seventeen must be detained separately from
adults. 68 And although Illinois allows adolescents over the age of
ten to be detained in a county jail, 69 the detention is limited to just
six hours for minors between the age of ten and twelve. 70
Collectively, these policy decisions demonstrate a clear
understanding that juvenile offenders should not be treated like
adult criminals.

D. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and
unusual punishment[.]” 71 The primary purpose of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment is to
prevent the state from inflicting “barbaric” punishments, such as
torture, upon criminal offenders. 72 In addition to such
prohibitions, the Eighth Amendment also requires that a criminal
offender’s punishment be proportionate to the crime. 73 Thus, the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause effectively guarantees that
criminal offenders will not be “subjected to excessive sanctions.” 74
Further, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause demands that
the state treat criminal offenders, regardless of the seriousness of
their crime, with the same human decency and respect afforded to
the rest of society. 75

permit’ for developing maturity; they are generally under the watchful eye of
caring individuals and are afforded more tolerance form society for making
bad choices.” MULVEY & SCHUBERT, supra note 28, at 5.
64. K OLLMANN, supra note 49, at 14.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-410(2)(c)(v) (2013).
69. 405/5-410(2)(a).
70. Id.
71. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
72. 21A AM . JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 878, Westlaw (database updated Aug.
2014) [hereinafter AM . JUR.].
73. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2458.
74. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
75. AM . JUR., supra note 72, § 878.
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In determining whether a particular type of punishment is
“categorically prohibited” by the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme
Court applies an objective two-part test. 76 First, the Court takes a
national assessment and explores the “objective indicia of society’s
standards” to determine whether a “national consensus” exists
against the employment of the punishment in question. 77 Then,
the Court examines the text of the Eighth Amendment,
interpreting its meaning, function, and purpose, to determine
whether the punishment in question violates the spirit and
mandates of the Eighth Amendment. 78 In conducting this analysis,
the Court examines both the history of the Eighth Amendment
and its own precedent. 79
When the Court confronts a case about whether a juvenile
offender’s punishment was constitutionally excessive, the Court
explores additional mitigating factors like the juvenile offender’s
age, background, and cognitive or emotional capabilities. 80 In fact,
in Graham v. Florida, the Court provided that a consideration of
age was not only proper but also constitutionally required, stating
that “criminal procedure laws that fail to take [a] defendants’
youthfulness into account at all would be flawed.” 81 The Court
explores these additional factors in juvenile cases because the
Court cannot determine whether a juvenile offender’s punishment
was constitutionally excessive unless it determines whether the
punishment was proportional to the crime. 82 Any reasonable
consideration of proportionality requires an evaluation of such
basic mitigating factors as age, background, and cognitive
development. 83

E. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on the
Punishment of Juveniles
In 2005, the Supreme Court recognized that developmental
research indisputably shows adolescents are cognitively and
fundamentally different than adults. Therefore, they are less
culpable and should be treated differently in the eyes of the law. 84
In that case—Roper v. Simmons—seventeen-year-old Christopher
Simmons allegedly murdered Shirley Crook after they got in an
automobile accident. 85 Simmons was tried as an adult and found
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467.
81. AM . JUR., supra note 72, § 878.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. K OLLMANN, supra note 49, at 20.
85. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556. Simmons assured two of his friends that they
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guilty of murder. 86 The State of Missouri sought the death
penalty. 87 The Supreme Court held, however, that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the death sentence for
individuals under the age of eighteen. 88
In its analysis, the Court examined the states’ collective
stance on juvenile death penalties; thirty states prohibited it. 89
The Court asserted that the death penalty is an excessive sanction
reserved for offenders who commit serious crimes and whose
“extreme culpability” warranted execution. 90 The Court found that
juveniles are categorically less culpable than adults, and,
therefore, could never attain such a level of culpability. 91 As part
of its reasoning, the Court noted that three “general differences”
between adults and juveniles under the age of eighteen
demonstrate that juvenile offenders “cannot with reliability be
classified among the worst offenders.” 92 The three general
differences the Court noted are as follows: (1) juveniles do not have
the necessary maturity and responsibility to make good decisions;
(2) juveniles do not have the necessary resolve to avoid negative
pressure and influences; and (3) juveniles do not have the fully
formed identities and characters to function as adults. 93
Several years after Roper, the Supreme Court faced a related
issue in Graham v. Florida. Jamar Graham was arrested and
convicted of armed burglary with assault and attempted armed
robbery. 94 Graham was charged as an adult and ultimately

could get away with murder because they were minors. Id. The three juveniles
entered Shirley Crook’s home, bound her, and brought her to a railroad trestle
where they drowned her in the river. Id. After the murder, Simmons was
caught bragging about the murder and eventually confessed. Id. at 557.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 578.
89. Id. at 552; see also, Charles Scott, Roper v. Simmons: Can Juvenile
Offenders be Executed?, 33 J. AM . ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 547, 549 (2005),
available at http://www.jaapl.org/content/33/4/547.full (explaining that after
the United States Supreme Court ruling in Stanford v. Kentucky, there was a
significant enough change among the states to forbid the execution of
juveniles). The Court in Atkins v. Virginia also argued a similar point. See
Scott, supra note 89, at 549.
90. Roper, 543 U.S. at 553 (emphasizing the Eighth Amendment’s
application to only a “narrow category of the most serious crimes”) (emphasis
added).
91. Id. at 572–73. The court analogized its findings on the mentally
retarded to juveniles, stating “the lesser culpability of the mentally retarded
offender surely does not merit that form of retribution. The same conclusions
follow from the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender.” Id. at 553. See also
Scott, supra note 89, at 552 (arguing that the differing juvenile characteristics
that the court enumerated in Roper could be applied to a number of categories
of individuals).
92. Id. at 569.
93. Id.
94. Graham, 560 U.S. at 53.
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accepted a plea agreement. 95 A few months later, Graham was
arrested for participating in a “home invasion robbery.” 96 Because
Graham violated the conditions of his probation, 97 the trial court
sentenced him to life in prison without the opportunity for
parole. 98 In reviewing this decision, the Court held that the Eighth
Amendment prohibits juveniles from being sentenced to life
imprisonment without parole for non-homicide offenses. 99 The
Court reasoned that, although thirty-eight states allow sentences
of life in prison without the possibility of parole for juveniles who
have committed non-homicide crimes, there were only about 109
juveniles actually serving such sentences. 100 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that the states’ “sentencing practice[s]” made a
sentence of life without parole just as rare as other sentencing
practices that the Court found cruel and unusual. 101 The Court
ultimately held that a life sentence without the possibility of
parole is too severe of a punishment for juvenile offenders. 102
95. Id. at 53–54.
96. Id. at 54.
97. See id. (describing Graham’s probation violation as engaging in
criminal activity, associating with individuals engaging in criminal activity,
and having a firearm in his possession).
98. Id. at 57. The trial judge expressed his disappointment at the sentence,
stating:
[a]nd I don’t understand why you would be given such a great
opportunity to do something with your life and why you would throw it
away. The only thing that I can rationalize is that you decided that this
is how you were going to lead your life and that there is nothing that we
can do for you . . . if I can’t do anything to help you, if I can’t do anything
to get you back on the right path, then I have to start focusing on the
community and trying to protect the community from your actions. And,
unfortunately, that is where we are today[.]
Id. at 56–57.
99. Id. at 74. In Graham, the court melded “two separate constitutional
holdings together to create a third.” Robert Smith & G. Ben Cohen,
Redemption Song: Graham v. Florida and the Evolving Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence, 108 MICH. L. REV . FIRST IMPRESSIONS 86, 91 (2010).
Specifically, the Court built on both the constitutional principle that capital
punishment is not permissible for individuals who have committed nonhomicide crimes and Ropers’ finding that juveniles have reduced culpability
because of their adolescent development. Id. By combing these, the Court
concluded that “when compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who
did not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral culpability.”
Graham, 560 U.S. at 70.
After Graham, some states started reevaluating their transfer provisions
and policies. Visser & Shook, supra note 20, at 25.
100. Graham, 560 U.S. at 62–63.
101. Id. at 62–66. The Court also recognized that a state may leave laws on
the books that allow juvenile offenders of non-homicide crimes to be charged
with life sentences without the possibility of parole even if the legislature does
not find the practice appropriate. Id. at 66–67.
102. Id. at 82.
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III. ANALYSIS
Presumptive waivers of juvenile offenders into the adult
criminal justice system are inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s
explicit determination that adolescent offenders are less culpable
than adult offenders due to their limited cognitive development. 103
This analysis explores the ways in which state presumptive
waivers conflict with the Court’s jurisprudence on juvenile
culpability. Also, it addresses the reasons why presumptive
waivers are problematic and how incarceration in adult prisons
undercuts the juvenile justice system’s goals.

A. Rehabilitation and Culpability
Rehabilitation and culpability are integral components of our
criminal justice system. Rehabilitation is not only the primary goal
of juvenile justice systems; it is also a driving force in the majority
of adult criminal justice systems. 104 Rehabilitation and treatment
methods are particularly important in our criminal justice system
because they have a tendency to lower recidivism rates. 105
Consistent with these principles, prisons have implemented a
variety of “treatment” methods that are geared towards
rehabilitating criminal offenders. 106 The criminal justice system
also accounts for the “varying levels of blameworthiness” that each
offender possesses. 107 Pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, a

103. In Roper, the Court recognized that juveniles cannot be classified
among the worst offenders. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. The Court described how
juveniles’ irresponsible behavior, immaturity, and susceptibility to negative
influences makes them less morally accountable than adults. Id. at 570. The
Court even determined that the probability that an adolescent offender
engages in any sort of “cost-benefit analysis” during the commission of his or
her offense is “so remote” that it is “virtually nonexistent.” Id. at 572.
104. See Rehabilitation—Correctional Programs in the United States, AM .
LAW AND LEGAL INFO., http://law.jrank.org/pages/1935/Rehabilitation-Correc
tional-programs-in-United-States.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2014) (providing
that although rehabilitative measures have diminished over the past several
decades, rehabilitation is still alive and well in our criminal justice system).
105. Id.
106. See, e.g., Corrections & Reentry, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE ,
https://www.crimesolutions.gov/TopicDetails.aspx?ID=31 (last visited Nov. 3,
2014) (listing such programs).
107. Samantha Schad, Adolescent Decision Making: Reduced Culpability in
the Criminal Justice System and Recognition of Capability in Other Legal
Contexts, 14 J. OF HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 375, 389 (2011), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1192&co
ntext=jhclp&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.bing.com%2Fsearch
%3Fq%3Dimportance%2Bof%2Bculpability%2Bin%2Bcriminal%2Bjustice%2B
system%26first%3D9%26FORM%3DPERE#search=%22importance%20culpab
ility%20criminal%20justice%20system%22.
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criminal offender’s punishment should be proportional to both the
crime and his or her culpability. 108 The criminal acts of an offender
with diminished levels of culpability provides less insight into his
or her risk of recidivism and fails to justify as significant a
retributive punishment. Thus, such offenders are generally prime
candidates for rehabilitative treatment.

B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Juveniles Are Less
Culpable and More Amenable to Rehabilitation
The differences between juveniles and adults are too “marked
and well understood” to allow the punishment of juveniles to
mirror that of adults. 109 The Supreme Court’s expansion of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence has categorically found adolescents to
be less culpable than adults for the same reasons that juveniles
are more amenable to rehabilitation. 110 In Roper, the Court
provided three reasons why juvenile offenders are less culpable
than adult offenders: juveniles (1) are immature, (2) may be highly
subject to influence, and (3) have unformed identities. 111
As discussed above, the Court in Roper and Graham held that
the under-developed cognitive abilities of juveniles contribute to
their immaturity, susceptibility of negative influences, and
evolving identities. The Roper Court found that these underdeveloped cognitive abilities are transient 112 and that most teens
grow out of them. 113 The transient nature of adolescent
108. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2458.
109. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73. States implicitly recognize the differences
between adults and juveniles by restricting juveniles’ ability to “marry, serve
on juries, vote, drink alcohol, and contract.” Ellen Marrus & Irene Merker
Rosenberg, After Roper v. Simmons: Keeping Kids Out of Adult Criminal
Court, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV . 1151, 1162–63 (2005). But see Elizabeth S. Scott
et al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW &
HUM . BEHAV . 221, 221 (1995) (noting that paternalistic procedures of law may
be less appropriate when applied to adolescents rather than younger minors).
110. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. The Court frankly stated, “Retribution is
not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one whose
culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by
reason of youth and immaturity.” Id. at 571.
111. See id. at 569 (examining the underdeveloped sense of responsibility
and immaturity found in youth that leads to poorly thought-out decisions and
actions; the vulnerability of juveniles to succumb to negative external
influences and pressures; juveniles’ lack of control and lack of experience; and
the transitory nature of juveniles’ personality traits caused by the absence of
identity or character).
112. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 66–70 (finding that there was a greater
possibility for juveniles to be reformed than there was for adults); see also
Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (finding that teen’s immaturity, recklessness, and
irresponsibility dissipates as they grow and develop an identity).
113. Graham, 560 U.S. at 66–70; see also Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (arguing
that most teens who are immature, reckless, and irresponsible grow out of this
phase, because these characteristics that mark adolescence are fleeting; once
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characteristics means that juveniles have the capacity to change
their behavior. 114 In fact, the Court in Graham explained that
juveniles are more capable of change than adults because of their
under-developed cognitive functions and temporarily immature
nature. 115 An individual’s maturity can lead to reflection on one’s
past actions, creating “remorse, renewal, and rehabilitation.” 116
Thus, juveniles’ actions are less likely to indicate an “irretrievably
depraved character” that is generally associated with adult
criminal offenders. 117 Because juveniles are more capable of
changing their behavior, it logically follows that juveniles have a
greater capacity to reform their character deficiencies through
rehabilitation. 118 On the other hand, the Court opined that a
juvenile who has not been given an opportunity to rehabilitate
himself has no meaningful incentive to become a productive,
responsible citizen. 119
The reasoning used in Roper and Graham was also adopted in
Miller v. Alabama. 120 The Court in Miller held that any person or
entity that awards a sentence to a juvenile offender of life without
any possibility of parole must examine all the relevant
circumstances that are related to the juvenile’s youthfulness and
his or her offense. 121 These factors include the juvenile’s age,
background, and cognitive ability at the time of the offense. 122
Miller clearly requires that all courts consider these factors and
circumstances before implementing such a sentence. 123
Both Roper and Graham relied more heavily on insight and
intuition than on scientific evidence when discussing the cognitive
difference of juveniles. 124 But numerous studies substantiate the
premise that juveniles are more susceptible than adults to
changing their behavior. 125 There is a consensus among
an adolescent’s identity is shaped and settled, these adolescent characteristics
dissipate).
114. Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
115. Graham, 560 U.S. at 68–69.
116. Id. at 79.
117. Id. at 76.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
121. Id. at 2469.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Barry Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount,
31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 277 (2013) (arguing that the Court’s use of phrases like
“as any parent knows” indicates that it relied more on intuition than on action
scientific studies).
125. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development
and the Regulation of Youth Crime, 18 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 15, 19
(2008) (explaining that studies in developmental psychology suggest juvenile
offenders are differentiated from adult offenders by an inability to make sound
decisions, a susceptibility to external pressures, and an undeveloped
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developmental psychologists that between the ages of twelve and
fifteen there is significant cognitive, emotional, and physical
development. 126 According to the American Academy of Child and
Adolescent Psychiatry, the brain does not stop maturing until an
individual is approximately twenty-years-old. 127 Because of this
disparity
in
cognitive
development,
adolescents
are
developmentally different from adults. These differences must be
taken into consideration during all stages of a juvenile’s criminal
proceedings, especially those regarding transfer. 128
Of course, these cognitive characteristics do not imply that
juvenile offenders should not be punished for their actions. 129 On
the contrary, juveniles must be punished; but all criminal
punishment must be tailored to a criminal’s culpability and should
be geared toward rehabilitation. 130 Criminal law is based on the
premise that individuals generally form intent whenever they
engage in some sort of action. 131 The law also assumes that
individuals use rules of law when forming this intent. 132 However,
adolescents often do not operate and act based on reason. Instead,
they react based on instinct; thus, they are not always cognizant of
how they should conform their behavior to the mandates of the
law. When courts are sentencing and punishing adolescent
offenders, they should be cognizant of the ineffectiveness and
inapplicability of principles that apply to sentencing and
punishing adults.

character, all of which mitigate their culpability).
126. Scott, supra note 109, at 230–35.
127. Laurence Steinberg, Adulthood: What the Brain Says About Maturity,
N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/05/28/do-we-need-toredefine-adulthood/adulthood-what-the-brain-says-about-maturity
(last
updated May 29, 2012); see also Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Suparna
Choudhury, Development of the Adolescent Brain: Implications for Executive
Function and Social Cognition, 47 J. OF CHILD AND PSYCHIATRY 296, 300
(2006) (explaining that the two regions of the brain—the parietal cortex and
the prefrontal cortex—consistently undergo development during adolescence).
128. ROBERT E. SHEPARD, JR., CRIM . JUSTICE SEC., AM . BAR ASSOC.,
YOUTH IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM : AN ABA TASK FORCE REPORT 1–2
(2002), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/
criminal_justice_section_newsletter/crimjust_juvjus_jjpolicies_YCJSReport.au
thcheckdam.pdf; see also Jacqueline Caster, The Insanity of Sentencing Minors
to Adult Prison: The Maryland Study, HUFF. POST, http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/jacqueline-caster/the-insanity-of-sentencin_b_758922.html (last updated
May 25, 2011) (arguing that treating juveniles like adults is inconsistent with
the scientific evidence that a juvenile’s brain has not fully developed the parts
of the brain that govern decision making and analysis of consequences).
129. Caster, supra note 128.
130. See id. (arguing that juveniles should not be exempt from
punishment, but they should be given more lenient sentences based on their
diminished culpability).
131. Stephen J. Morse, Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM . L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 15, 19 (2001).
132. Id.
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C. Adult Prisons Are Not Geared toward
Rehabilitation or Protecting the Community from
Juvenile Offenders
Adult correctional facilities are not geared toward
rehabilitation. 133 Sending a juvenile to an adult prison is like
sending them to their very own graduate school for criminals. 134
In such settings, juveniles almost certainly will not be
appropriately rehabilitated because they will not acquire
necessary skills that foster a positive cognitive development into
adulthood. 135
The regimented schedules and restrictions that are
implemented in adult prisons reduce adolescents’ opportunities to
develop important skills and imperative relationships. The effects
are wide-ranging; they are unable to engage in romantic
relationships, create healthy friendships, identify career goals, or
develop occupational skills. 136 Additionally, incarceration in an
adult facility, at an early age, severely interferes with the
development of an adolescent’s self and identity 137 because adult
correctional facilities are designed to “break down” identities, not
foster fragile, new ones. 138 The incarceration of juvenile offenders
in adult correctional facilities have produced numerous negative
effects on juveniles aside from developmental disruptions, 139
death, 141
increased
rate
of
including
victimization, 140
133. HARTNEY, supra note 5, at 1.
134. See Caster, supra note 128 (quoting an inmate arrested as a juvenile
who stated, "Why adult prison? It's not to help you better yourself, but to
transform you in the most messed up ways because you hear and see more
crime.”). Placing juvenile offenders in prison with “hardened adult criminals”
does not reduce or deter crime. Id.
135. See Swansey v. Elrod, 386 F. Supp. 1138, 1141–42 (N.D. Ill. 1975)
(delineating the psychological differences between children aged thirteen to
sixteen and young adults aged seventeen to twenty). In Swansey, the
plaintiffs’ expert found that adult prisons did not recognize these psychological
differences. Id. at 1141. Therefore, incarceration of adolescents in the adult
criminal justice system had substantial detrimental and emotional effects on
them. Id. at 1141–42.
136. MULVEY & SCHUBERT, supra note 28, at 6.
137. See id. (navigating the adolescent developmental period adequately
requires interaction with supportive adults, positive relationships with peers,
along with ample opportunities to make self-governing decisions).
138. Id.
139. HARTNEY, supra note 5, at 1.
140. Id. Juveniles in adult facilities may be subjected “to physical, sexual,
and or psychological victimization.” MULVEY & SCHUBERT, supra note 28, at 4.
“Incarcerating children in the adult system puts them at higher risk of abuse,
injury, and death while they are in the system[.]” ARYA, supra note 2, at 7.
“[J]uveniles in adult facilities are five times more likely to be sexually
assaulted and two times more likely to be beaten by staff than youth held in
juvenile facilities.” MULVEY & SCHUBERT, supra note 28, at 4.
141. ARYA, supra note 2, at 7.
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recidivism, 142 criminal stigma that affects their future
educational and occupational opportunities, 143 and the potential
of harsher punishment. 144
Transferring juveniles into adult correctional facilities is a
big deal. Most juveniles are negatively affected for the rest of
their lives, which is why it is paramount that juveniles are
individually examined to determine whether they are as culpable
as an adult and will not be amenable to treatment. 145 The juvenile
justice system was specifically designed to function differently
from adult correctional facilities in order to cater to the
developmental and rehabilitative needs of juveniles. 146

D. Presumptive Waivers are Inconsistent with
Supreme Court Rulings
Fifteen states use presumptive waivers to transfer juveniles
into the adult court system. 147 Illinois enacted transfer provisions,
like presumptive waivers, to protect society and hold juveniles
accountable for their actions. 148 In Illinois, the presumptive waiver
creates a rebuttable presumption that any juvenile who commits a
specific statutory offense 149 is “not a fit and proper subject” for
142. Most studies have failed to show that transfer laws have a deterrent
effect on crime. G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 26. To the contrary, research
has found that transferred youth are more likely to recidivate and reoffend
more quickly than non-transferred youth. MULVEY & SCHUBERT, supra note
28, at 7; HARTNEY, supra note 5, at 1. Thus, it seems adolescents’ experiences
and conditions in adult facilities “make[] it more likely that they will reoffend
once they get out.” ARYA, supra note 2, at 7.
143. HARTNEY, supra note 5, at 1.
144. Id.
145. See MULVEY & SCHUBERT, supra note 28 (explaining the effects of
juveniles who are sent to the criminal justice system. Depending on the
juvenile—his or her personality and anti-social behavior—juveniles who are
transferred to the adult court system usually continue to engage in criminal
activity).
146. BOSTWICK, supra note 11, at 1.
147. G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 4. Alaska, California, Colorado, the
District of Columbia, Illinois, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and
Utah all use presumptive waivers. Id. at 3.
148. During the late 1980s and 1990s, the public believed that the juvenile
justice system was far too lenient on juvenile offenders. LAWRENCE &
HEMMENS, supra note 23, at 33. Faced with a dearth of public trust in the
juvenile justice system, state legislatures tried to implement statutory
provisions that would keep serious juvenile offenders off the streets. MULVEY
& SCHUBERT, supra note 28, at 2. This was, essentially, a “law and order”
approach. LAWRENCE & HEMMENS, supra note 23, at 33. The Illinois Juvenile
Justice Reform Provision of the Illinois Juvenile Court Act adopted balanced
and restorative justice principles. BOSTWICK, supra note 11, at 1–2. In keeping
with the public mood of the 1980s and 1990s, two of the three goals behind the
act were accountability and public safety. Id.
149. The triggering offenses are: any Class X felony aside from armed
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treatment in the juvenile justice system. 150 Under these
circumstances, the burden of proof shifts to the juvenile, requiring
that he or she rebut this presumption by clear and convincing
evidence and show amenability to the care and treatment of the
juvenile justice system. 151 By shifting the burden of proof,
presumptive waivers presume that juveniles who commit certain
offenses are neither more capable of rehabilitation nor less
culpable than adults who commit the same offenses.
These statutory presumptions, which treat and punish
adolescents like adults, are completely inconsistent with the
Court’s decisions in both Roper and Graham. 152 The Court
explicitly found that juveniles are categorically less culpable than
adults. 153 But judicial presumptive waivers presume—without
examining the individual first—that certain juveniles should be
treated as adults. Unless the state is systematically underpunishing adult offenders or juveniles are as culpable as adults,
this practice would violate the requirement of proportionality. The
former possibility is facially unreasonable. The latter is directly
contrary to the Court’s findings, and state statutes cannot
presume the opposite of what the Court has dictated 154—that
violence, aggravated discharge of a firearm, armed violence with a fire arm
when the predicate offense is a Class 1 of 2 felony, armed violence with a
firearm when the predicate offense is a violation of the Illinois Controlled
Substances Act, a violation of the Cannabis Control Act, an act in violation of
Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substance Act while in school, and an act
in violation of Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act while on
school property or public ways. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2)(a) (2013).
150. Id. In California, there is actually a presumption that a juvenile who
commits a specific, serious offense that falls within the statutory provision of a
presumptive waiver is not a “fit and proper subject” to be handled within the
juvenile justice system. Tamar L. Reno, Comment, The Rebuttable
Presumption for Serious Juvenile Crimes: An Alternative to Determinative
Sentencing in Texas, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REV . 1421, 1442 (1995).
151. A judge must find by clear and convincing evidence that a juvenile is
amenable to “the care, treatment, and training programs” that the juvenile
justice system offers in their facilities. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2)(b)
(2013). In making this determination, the judge must consider a list of factors:
age of the minor, history of the minor, circumstances of the offense,
advantages of treatment, and whether the security of the public requires
sentencing. Id.
152. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (explaining that adolescence is a mitigating
factor for juvenile criminal behavior primarily because juvenile immaturity
and reckless behavior are temporary; they subside with maturity); Graham,
560 U.S. 66–70 (maintaining that juveniles are more capable of change than
adults are and that juveniles cannot be categorized in the same group as the
“worst offenders” because of their marked differences from adults).
153. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (explaining that the immaturity,
irresponsibility, influential nature of juveniles makes their offenses less
“morally reprehensible” than adults).
154. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (stating that the United States Constitution
is the supreme law of the land); Brown v. Board of Education (II), 349 U.S.
294, 299–300 (1955) (ruling that federal law, including a judgment of the
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juveniles are less culpable than adults. 155 Further, the Court has
held that criminal sentences must be “directly related to the
personal culpability of the criminal offender.” 156 Generalizations
and presumptions about culpability are clearly inconsistent with
this instruction. Likewise, broad arguments about retribution
cannot save presumptive transfers when they fail to comply with
basic constitutional principles. The Court already rejected the
retribution argument for sending juveniles to adult correctional
facilities and differentiating the application of retributive
justifications to adults and juveniles. 157
To rebut such arguments, Illinois may argue that
presumptive waivers are necessary for public safety. 158 It is not
clear that such waivers actually improve public safety. The
Supreme Court has recognized that juveniles denied the chance to
rehabilitate have no meaningful incentive to become a productive,
responsible citizen. 159 If juveniles have no incentive or desire to
become law abiding, responsible adults, these transfer laws will
have a minimal deterrent effect on juveniles and may even be
counterproductive by forcing them into a life of crime. Even if
such waivers did improve public safety, however, the narrow
category of presumptive waivers would not be necessary to
achieve this goal because there are other judicial waivers that
achieve this same goal without wrongly presuming that
adolescents are as culpable as adults. There are a number of
judicial waivers that protect the public from the same undesired
effect,
like
discretionary
and
prosecutorial
waivers. 160
Presumptive waivers are not necessary; they are merely one of
many ways to accomplish public safety. All of the juvenile
transfer laws accomplish public safety directives; therefore, any of
the other juvenile transfer laws could take the place of
presumptive waivers.
Illinois may also argue that presumptive waivers are
procedurally fair because they allow a juvenile to be heard in
front of a judge before being transferred. This does not absolve
the waiver’s inherent inconsistency with the Supreme Court’s
Supreme Court, could not be nullified by state legislation or action); Ableman
v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, 526 (1859) (holding that state courts cannot issue
judgments that conflict with the United State Supreme Court’s judgments).
155. Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
156. Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 (emphasis added).
157. Id.
158. BRANDAU, supra note 25, at 3; see Hector Linares & Derwyn Bunton,
An Open Door to the Criminal Courts: Analyzing the Evolution of Louisiana's
System for Juvenile Waiver, 71 LA. L. REV . 191, 214 (2010) (arguing that the
ineffective use or overuse of waivers can have a counterproductive effect on
the youth, and would ultimately undermine the entire reason they were
implemented in the first place—for public safety).
159. Graham, 560 U.S. at 79.
160. G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.
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previous rulings. The mere possibility that a judge might rule
against a presumptive waiver provides little reassurance. In fact,
such an argument is quite strange. The ability to contest a
presumptive practice might improve the efficient operation of that
practice. But the chance that a presumption might be inapplicable
at certain times cannot possibly justify the presumption’s
application at other times. Thus, the real issue is the rebuttable
presumption itself. Requiring a juvenile to show by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she is amenable to treatment and
less culpable than adults does not follow the Court’s logic in Roper
and Graham.
Because there is a presumption that juveniles are less
culpable and more susceptible to treatment, they should not be
treated otherwise without further evidence. Instead, they should
be transferred based on their individual traits, as well as their
offense.

IV. PROPOSAL
Abolishing presumptive waivers will neither interfere with
Illinois’s statutory scheme nor thwart its ability to transfer
juveniles into the adult court system. Illinois already has several
provisions in place that will accomplish the intended goals,
without offending Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. 161 This Proposal
still allows Illinois to offer discretionary and mandatory waivers,
which provide a similar hearing, analysis of factors, and
assessment of specific characteristics of the juvenile offender. 162
Discretionary and mandatory waivers allow juveniles to be
transferred into the adult criminal justice system without
offending the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.
As described above, the Supreme Court has recently etched
away at the overly harsh and stringent state statutory provisions
specifically enacted to allow juveniles to be transferred into the
adult court system. 163 In doing so, the Court has also created
categorical rules about the general culpability of juveniles. 164
Contrary to Supreme Court jurisprudence, presumptive waivers
161. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(1), (3) contain mandatory and
discretionary waivers, neither of which shift the burden of proof onto the
juvenile. Rather, the burden of proof remains on the prosecutor to prove that
the juvenile is not amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system.
162. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(1), (3).
163. See Emily C. Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted
of Felony Murder in the Wake of Roper, Graham & J.D.B., 11 CONN. PUB. INT.
L.J. 297, 297 (2012) (recognizing that “[s]ince 2005, the United States
Supreme Court has issued a trilogy of opinions affirming the proposition that
children and adolescents are different than adults in fundamental—and
constitutionally relevant—ways”).
164. Roper, 543 U.S. at 552; Graham, 560 U.S. at 66–70; Smith & Cohen,
supra note 99, at 91.
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incorrectly assume that juveniles are just as culpable as adults
and are not amenable to the juvenile justice system. In essence,
presumptive waivers require that juveniles prove what the
Supreme Court has already recognized. State legislatures need to
amend their existing statutes to conform to these rulings. 165
Specifically, Illinois must abolish presumptive judicial waivers of
juveniles into the adult court system. This imperative may be
accomplished by repealing the statutory provision under 705 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2) that allows presumptive transfers of
juveniles into the adult criminal justice system.
Removing this subsection from the statute does not impede
the statutory scheme or purpose of 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805.
Illinois still has multiple statutory provisions and waivers 166 that
produce the same effect of efficiently transferring juvenile
offenders into the adult court system. First, Illinois prosecutors
have the ability to transfer juveniles into the adult court system
by way of a discretionary judicial waiver. The judge has the
ultimate discretion to transfer a juvenile offender into the adult
court system after the judge has analyzed all of the statutory
factors. 167 In Illinois, discretionary waivers are available when a
juvenile offender who is thirteen-years or more of age is charged
with a criminal offense. 168 In these circumstances, the State, not
the juvenile, must move to transfer. 169 After an assessment of the
facts of the case balanced against the statutory factors, the judge
makes a decision whether the juvenile will be tried in the juvenile
or adult court. 170
Second, Illinois prosecutors have the ability to transfer
juveniles into the adult court system by way of a mandatory
judicial waiver. 171 Mandatory waivers require the juvenile court to
initiate a case and automatically waive jurisdiction when the
juvenile’s offense meets certain statutory criteria. 172 These criteria
include age, offense, or prior record. 173 In Illinois, a juvenile
165. See Donna M. Bishop, Juvenile Offenders in the Adult Criminal
Justice System, 27 CRIME & JUST. 81, 85, 155 (2000) (concluding that the
overwhelming expansion of juvenile transfer legislation has been “ill advised”
and “misguided” and that “[t]ransfer should be reserved for those ‘“extreme
cases’” to which it has traditionally been applied”).
166. See 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(1), (3).
167. See G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 2 (explaining discretionary
judicial waivers as setting forth expansive standards to be applied, factors to
be determined, and mechanisms to be followed during the judge’s decision
making).
168. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(3).
169. Id. See CHILDREN’S ACTION ALLIANCE , supra note 35, at 6
(emphasizing that prosecutors may request discretionary waiver of juveniles
into the juvenile court system).
170. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(3).
171. 405/5-805(1).
172. Id.
173. Id.
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offender who commits a felony, forcible felony, aggravated
discharge of a weapon in a school, or a listed crime under the 705
ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(1), and is fifteen years of age or older,
will be mandatorily transferred into the adult court system if he or
she committed a forcible felony, was previously convicted of a
forcible felony, or committed his or her crime in furtherance of
gang activity. The sole focus of mandatory waivers are the
statutory criteria, which are far more extensive than the criteria
set forth for presumptive waivers in Illinois. 174 Most important,
the judge must establish that these criteria are satisfied. In
contrast to this, presumptive waivers allow the state to trigger the
presumption by motion whenever a juvenile commits a certain
offense. 175 No other questions asked.
Although discretionary and mandatory waivers require
different criteria than a presumptive waiver, they provide the
same result as a presumptive waiver. Both waive jurisdiction in
the juvenile court and transfer the juvenile to the adult court
system. 176 The key differences between presumptive waivers and
the discretionary or mandatory waivers are: (1) who is making the
actual assessment and decision to transfer; (2) what criteria are
considered, and (3) who has the burden of proof. Aside from these,
all three waivers have the same operative effect and will function
in the same capacity.
Illinois’s presumptive judicial waiver shifts the burden of
proof onto the juvenile to prove that he or she is less culpable and
therefore amenable to the juvenile justice system. 177 When a
presumptive waiver is used to transfer a juvenile into the adult
court system, there are underlying assumptions that the juvenile
is just as culpable as an adult and is not amenable to the juvenile
justice system. These assumptions directly contradict the Supreme
Court’s holding in Roper that juveniles are categorically less
culpable than adults. 178 Juveniles have the ability to change their
behavior and reform their character and they are categorically
amenable to treatment and rehabilitation in the juvenile justice
system. 179 Because juveniles are categorically less culpable than
adults and amenable to treatment in the juvenile justice system, 180
174. Id.
175. 405/5-805(2).
176. 405/5-805.
177. See 405/5-805(2)(a) (stating that juveniles who commit any offenses
listed within this statute are deemed to be improper and “unfit” for any
rehabilitation afforded by the juvenile justice system).
178. “Both Roper and Graham relied heavily on adolescent development
and brain science research showing that adolescents are fundamentally
different from adults in ways that render them categorically less culpable and
less deserving of society's harshest forms of punishments.” Keller, supra note
163, at 297.
179. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70.
180. Id.
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Illinois cannot allow presumptive judicial waivers of juveniles into
the adult court system.

V. CONCLUSION
Following the perception of a dramatic increase in juvenile
crime in the late 1980s and 1990s, state legislatures enacted more
expansive juvenile transfer laws to transfer juveniles into the
adult court system more easily. 181 Illinois’s juvenile transfer laws
include discretionary, presumptive, and mandatory judicial
waivers, statutory exclusions, “once an adult always an adult
laws,” and blended sentencing. 182
Recently, the Supreme Court has responded to these statutory
provisions, and categorically ruled that juveniles are less culpable
than adults, and therefore, are more amenable to rehabilitative
treatment. 183 Presumptive waivers directly conflict with the
Court’s finding because they shift the burden of proof onto the
juvenile to prove that he or she is amenable to rehabilitation in the
juvenile justice system, and incorrectly assume that juveniles are
just as culpable as adults.
In our criminal justice system, culpability is a significant
factor in determining sentencing and punishment. In light of this,
Illinois courts should exercise caution when they make juvenile
transfer determinations because transferred juveniles will be
punished and sentenced as adults. Juvenile offenders that are
transferred into the adult criminal justice system are not engaged
in any type of meaningful rehabilitation, much less the extensive
rehabilitation afforded in the juvenile justice system. Juveniles are
mentally, emotionally, and developmentally different than adults,
they are more susceptible to changing their behavior, and are
more amenable to rehabilitation. Therefore, Illinois should not
allow any type of rebuttable presumption that opposes or
disregards these facts.
Although juvenile transfers are necessary in certain cases,
Illinois should base the assessment of a juvenile transfer on the
merits of the individual juvenile without presuming anything
about the juvenile’s culpability or amenability to rehabilitation.
The burden of determining or proving that a juvenile should be
transferred must be borne by the judge or the prosecutor,
respectively. Juveniles must be presumed less culpable and more
amenable to rehabilitation unless proven otherwise. In light of
this, Illinois should repeal its presumptive judicial waiver statute,
705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-805(2) and re-focus its efforts on
rehabilitating juveniles in the juvenile justice system.
181. ARYA, supra note 2, at 7.
182. G RIFFIN ET AL., supra note 4, at 2–4.
183. See Keller, supra note 163, at 297.
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